INTERVIEW – US-Iran Deal Likely, Military Action Could Trigger Global Shock: Dr. Alghannam (1-2)

The US and Iran have been engaging in indirect talks regarding Tehran’s rapidly advancing nuclear program, raising hopes of a potential détente that could finally bring peace to the Middle East.

However, the failure of negotiations carries potential risks to the region, as the US President, Donald Trump, has repeatedly threatened Tehran of a military action in case a deal is not reached. Also, media reports pointed to Israeli plans of striking Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions.

Few experts can provide a well-balanced view on the recent talks and their impact on the entire region. In the light of this, Leaders MENA Magazine reached out to Dr. Hesham Alghannam to delve deeper into the opportunities and challenges presented by the ongoing US-Iran talks and their broader regional implications.

Dr. Alghannam is a Saudi researcher and geopolitical expert with over 23 years of experience in consulting and research in politics and international relations. His research focuses on policy and strategy in Saudi Arabia and abroad, as well as Iran’s nuclear program and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

He is also is the Director of the Security Research Center and General Supervisor of National Security and Counter-Terrorism Programs at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

Moreover, Dr. Alghannam is a fellow researcher and strategy consultant at various European, American and British think-tanks. He is a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. He has worked with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, and the Gulf Research Centre. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Exeter.

In this exclusive interview with Leaders MENA Magazine, Dr. Alghannam shares his perspectives on the US-Iran talks, the prospects for reaching a nuclear deal, and the potential consequences of military escalation against Iran.

Iranian Threat to US Interests

Q: After the Israeli significant blows to Hezbollah in Lebanon, US military strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, and Iran’s declining influence in Syria following the fall of Assad’s regime, does Iran still pose a major threat for the American and Israeli interests in the region?

Analyzing the regional landscape based on recent developments clearly indicates a tangible decline in Iranian influence across several of its traditional arenas. However, it is premature to conclude definitively that this decline equates to the elimination of the Iranian threat to American and Israeli interests. As events demonstrate, the structure of the Iranian threat is not solely based on geographical presence but on Tehran’s adaptability, repositioning capability, and employment of unconventional tools.

Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon have succeeded in limiting some of the group’s operational capabilities and imposing political costs internally. Moreover, Saudi political support and Qatari backing for Lebanon, indirectly bolster efforts to reduce Iranian dominance in Beirut. Nevertheless, Hezbollah has not been eradicated politically or militarily; it retains its missile arsenal, popular support base, and robust political networks.

In Yemen, US strikes against the Houthis have disrupted supply and attack chains, diminishing Iran’s ability to leverage the Red Sea strategically. Yet, the Houthis have not been defeated; instead, they have evolved into a stable local military player with considerable decision-making autonomy, even as ideological coordination with Tehran persists. Currently, they are more adept at managing conflict independently, indicating that neutralizing Iran doesn’t directly neutralize the Houthis.

In Syria, traditional Iranian presence has diminished due to the collapse of the Assad regime and the new agreement between Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Kurds, brokered by Turkey and the US, further limiting prospects for Iranian resurgence. Nonetheless, Iran still maintains networks of local militias and on-ground intelligence capabilities.

The most significant threat remains Iran’s nuclear file. Despite its geopolitical losses, Tehran entered the Rome negotiations in the strongest technical nuclear position in its history, currently holding uranium enriched to 60%, sufficient to rapidly assemble multiple bombs if desired. Any interim or weak agreement, as Israel warns, could solidify Iran’s status as a “nuclear threshold state” for an extended period.

The core point is that the Iranian threat is no longer linear and cannot be dismantled by a single blow. Instead, it resembles an interconnected web of military, religious, media, and economic influence, capable of contracting and later expanding again. Even as traditional positioning retreats, the intention, capacity for long-term investment, and ideological foundation remain intact.

Additionally, internal dynamics within the US administration remain unsettled. Analysis in The New York Times highlights contradictions in American rhetoric—between calls to fully dismantle the nuclear program (echoed by the National Security Advisor and Israeli commitments) and the practical discourse of Witkoff, who suggests returning to a 3.67% enrichment ceiling. Such ambiguity sends dual signals to Iran, granting it maneuvering space.

Therefore, while Iran today is indeed weaker compared to previous years and its disruptive operations face intensive intelligence monitoring from Israel and the Trump administration, the Iranian threat has not disappeared but transformed. It has become more complex and adept at concealment, making confrontation increasingly difficult and prolonged.

In conclusion, Iran has lost some influence, but its proxies remain active, and it continues to represent a significant threat to US and Israeli interests, albeit in a changed form and employing different tactics. Rebuilding Iran’s capacities requires time, but time alone does not ensure the threat’s disappearance. Instead, it might offer Tehran an opportunity to regain strength and act when vigilance wanes.

US-Iran Talks

Q: What are the prospects for reaching a nuclear deal between the US and Iran, in light of the ongoing talks?

The announcement by US President Donald Trump of direct talks with Iran regarding its nuclear program marks a significant turning point in US-Iran relations, presenting both substantial opportunities and complex challenges. Given the current circumstances, the prospects for reaching a realistic agreement between the two sides appear relatively high, although closely linked to their ability to overcome fundamental differences and offer mutual realistic concessions.

Iran enters these negotiations in a very strong nuclear position, currently possessing a sufficient stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, enough to produce one bomb per month, according to the latest reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This nuclear strength clearly enhances Tehran’s negotiating stance, but it is coupled with significant regional and economic weaknesses due to severe U.S. sanctions and internal collapse, making Iran more inclined to demonstrate flexibility to alleviate economic pressures.

On the American side, there is internal strategic ambiguity. While National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, demand the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, Special Envoy, Steve Witkoff, shows willingness to accept limited enrichment levels under strict international oversight. This internal division, although confusing, provides Trump with ample room to maneuver, allowing him to finalize an agreement that can be marketed domestically as a significant political and electoral achievement.

Iranian statements, voiced by chief negotiator, Abbas Araghchi, highlight Tehran’s readiness to offer limited yet essential concessions: accepting restrictions on enrichment levels and full cooperation with the IAEA in exchange for solid American guarantees against future withdrawal from the deal and immediate lifting of sanctions on its oil and financial sectors. This formula seems achievable if the United States provides sufficient guarantees to Iran, especially as Tehran insists on excluding its missile program from negotiations, limiting the scope for further concessions.

On the other hand, despite Israel’s strong opposition to any agreement not involving a complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, Netanyahu’s government today has significantly lost its previous influence over Washington’s decisions. This is particularly evident given Trump’s explicit declaration that he is not rushing into military action, prioritizing instead a diplomatic agreement to prevent widespread regional conflict. Indeed, Trump’s announcement freezing military attack plans signals a genuine preference for diplomacy, marking a crucial shift in regional power dynamics.

Public sentiment in Iran adds additional pressure towards settlement, as a large segment of Iranian society supports an agreement to alleviate economic pressures and prevent a broad regional war. This factor can serve as an additional negotiating tool for the United States, particularly if Washington invests in clear and actionable economic guarantees.

Regarding timing, Trump has set a two-month deadline to conclude the agreement, compelling both sides to move swiftly toward tangible progress. Moreover, upcoming international pressures in October regarding the potential re-imposition of international sanctions on Iran provide additional momentum for current negotiations, making Tehran more serious about quickly finalizing an agreement before this deadline.

Considering all these factors, the likelihood of reaching a new nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran appears high, provided both sides offer realistic concessions, coupled with clear US guarantees and effective management of regional pressures, particularly concerning Israel and other US allies. These circumstances create an opportune negotiating moment that could lead to an agreement preserving Iran’s civilian nuclear capabilities while ensuring the regional security sought by Washington and its allies.

Thus, the prospect of reaching a genuine agreement is possible but conditioned by three elements:

1. Washington’s ability to provide a guarantee mechanism—through a rapid treaty or third-party uranium hosting—that reassures Tehran that withdrawal will not recur.
2. Iran’s acceptance of quantitative and qualitative enrichment limits allowing the IAEA to regain “continuity of knowledge.”
3. Israeli restraint during the negotiation period, contingent upon Washington providing a deterrence and security compensation package addressing Tel Aviv’s concerns.

If these conditions are met by the end of Trump’s specified deadline, the agreement becomes likely. However, if any element falters, the scenario of military escalation returns to the forefront.

Military Escalation

Q: Given the recent US military movements to the Middle East and reciprocal threats between Washington and Tel Aviv on one side and Tehran on the other, do you expect a joint US-Israeli military action against Iranian nuclear sites in case of negotiations’ failure?

Given the current regional dynamics, rapid military developments, and the profound divergence in priorities between Washington and Tel Aviv, the likelihood of a joint US-Israeli military confrontation against Iran, should nuclear negotiations fail, remains possible but is constrained by political and strategic limitations. Clearly, military confrontation is prominent among complex and open-ended options but is not favored by either Washington or the Israeli security establishment at its core.

Starting from the top, Netanyahu is escalating tensions on all fronts not due to purely strategic justifications but driven by personal and ideological motivations. His escalation against Hezbollah, intensification of the Gaza conflict, and attempts to disrupt the Rome negotiations between the United States and Iran are driven by immense internal pressure, attempts to evade ongoing investigations and trials, and the containment of political dissent within Israeli society, including within the military itself.

This escalation is not surprising, aligning with Netanyahu’s ideological background influenced by the extreme right-wing factions ruling alongside him, which perceive Iran as an existential threat rather than merely a regional adversary. Thus, escalating tensions with Iran serves multiple objectives for Netanyahu, and pushing toward military confrontation at a critical moment, despite high costs to Israel itself, cannot be ruled out.

Conversely, the United States under Trump’s leadership sees things differently. Trump does not want to become embroiled in another war, especially during an election year, and particularly in a confrontation that could drag the US into direct conflict with Iran and its proxies across multiple fronts. Trump is a dealmaker, not a proponent of open-ended conflicts. He sees a deal with Iran—even if partial—as potentially ending years of tension, earning him political credit as the person who “stopped Iranian nuclear arms without war.”

Therefore, one cannot ignore the clear divergence between the two positions: Netanyahu seeks a military resolution to halt Iran’s program and weaken its regime, whereas Trump seeks a settlement achieving US objectives without triggering regional escalation.

Supporting this assessment is that Iran, despite its aggressive rhetoric, has not shut the door on negotiations. Statements by Abbas Araghchi, as documented by the New York Times, clearly indicate Tehran’s intent to participate “calmly and cautiously,” awaiting developments from closed-door discussions rather than public statements. This implies that diplomatic avenues remain cautiously open, with Tehran exploiting internal contradictions within the US administration—between the National Security Advisor demanding complete dismantlement and Witkoff’s acceptance of a 3.6% enrichment ceiling.

Thus, should negotiations fail, will Washington and Tel Aviv jointly head towards war? The answer is not a definitive yes but rather “possibly Israel alone.” Trump may resort to economic and political pressure, perhaps permitting a limited strike, but he would not engage in a full-scale regional war unless absolutely forced to. Netanyahu, however, might attempt to forcibly involve Washington through a unilateral military operation or broader conflict provocation, particularly in southern Lebanon or within Syria.

This risky venture, however, is fraught with dangers. Military action not pre-coordinated with Washington could result in Israel losing political cover and logistical support. Worse, Israel might find itself isolated against Iran, Hezbollah, potentially the Houthis, and Popular Mobilization Forces, without guaranteed rapid American support. Such a catastrophic scenario is untenable for Israel now, especially given the fragmented domestic front, societal divisions, and widespread protests among military reservists.

Therefore, while all options remain on the table and the military threat from both sides is genuine, comprehensive military action remains the riskiest but least realistic scenario if the Trump administration effectively manages the situation. The more American negotiation pressure increases on Iran, and Netanyahu’s provocations decrease, the smaller the chances of a military explosion.

Ultimately, military confrontation is neither ruled out nor inevitable. The outcome will be determined in Rome and behind-the-scenes negotiations between Trump and Netanyahu. If Trump decides a deal is preferable to escalation, he will pressure Netanyahu to curb aggression. However, if Washington fails to contain Netanyahu or if he acts independently, the world might awaken to an unwanted confrontation, with Israel bearing the highest cost.

Regional Balances

Q: How would a potential military action against Iran affect regional balances? And could it lead to the formation of new blocs?

If the United States and Israel undertake direct military action against Iran, regional balances will not only experience temporary disruption but could also enter a phase of complete reconfiguration, affecting the national security of countries across the region and reflecting upon the international system as a whole.

From a national security perspective, such an attack cannot be viewed as an action with limited impact; rather, it would serve as the spark for a wide-ranging conflict, given Iran’s central strategic and geographic importance. Iran is not an isolated state; it is a pivotal actor controlling multiple global strategic routes and possesses a cross-border influence network. Any direct targeting of its facilities or defensive structures will provoke coordinated responses from its allies and proxies across the Gulf, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, leading to simultaneous multi-front engagements.

Let’s consider the critical aspect: the strategic geographic dimension. Approximately 20% of global oil trade—over 21 million barrels per day—and about 25% of global liquefied natural gas trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, primarily headed toward Asia and Europe. Located entirely within Iranian territorial influence, this strait would immediately become the primary target in any confrontation. Closing or threatening navigation in this vital artery would instantly disrupt global energy supplies, and alternative routes, such as pipelines through Saudi Arabia or the UAE, could only cover a fraction of daily capacity.

Additionally, the Suez Canal, accounting for 12% to 15% of global trade, represents another critical chokepoint immediately vulnerable to tensions extending into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The recent experience in late 2023, when Iranian-affiliated militias threatened navigation in the Red Sea, led to a 67% reduction in container ship crossings through the canal within weeks, forcing international carriers to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope. This increased shipping costs by approximately $500 per container within one week and doubled transit times to Europe by about 10 to 15 days.

The eruption of a comprehensive war in this region would create an unprecedented international logistical crisis: disrupted shipping lines, port congestion, surges in insurance costs, and increased carbon footprints due to extended navigation routes. These consequences alone could significantly disrupt global supply chains essential to modern industrial economies.

In the energy markets, merely heightened tensions in recent months—without actual conflict—led to a rise in Brent crude prices by over $10 in just one week, nearly reaching $95 per barrel before later declining. Imagine the scenario of actual conflict. The International Energy Agency has already signaled readiness to release global emergency reserves (approximately 1.2 billion barrels), a measure typically reserved for complete disruptions or wars. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund warned that an oil price shock resulting from a full-scale war could raise global inflation by around 0.7% and slow growth by 0.2%, potentially tipping the world into stagflation.

Yet the greater catastrophe may lie not only in supply disruptions but also in demand collapses. The Gulf countries—specifically Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait—represent massive consumer markets and major importers of food, goods, services, and technology. War would prompt these states to reduce public and private spending, postpone projects, and halt non-essential imports. This would directly impact the economies of exporting countries—from Turkey, which exports billions to Iraq and the Gulf, to India, Egypt, and the Philippines, heavily reliant on remittances from hundreds of thousands of workers in Gulf states. These remittances could abruptly stop if evacuations occurred or if ongoing projects ceased operations.

A demand collapse in these markets would exert dual pressures: on industrialized countries exporting goods and developing nations dependent on remittances. Worse still, hundreds of thousands of families’ stability in developing countries would be threatened if their Gulf-based incomes vanished, turning the conflict from a purely military crisis into a catalyst for global social and economic turmoil.

Amid these challenges, alliance structures would inevitably shift, giving rise to unconventional blocs:

• Alliances focused on energy security.
• Others dedicated to securing international navigation.
• Potential situational alliances among former adversaries (such as Turkey and Gulf countries, or even China and the West) aiming to maintain minimum global stability.

However, the fundamental truth underlying this security assessment remains that no party will emerge victorious from such a war, regardless of their objectives. Unlike the Russia-Ukraine war, which affected specific markets (wheat and European energy), a conflict in the Middle East would strike at the infrastructure of the global economy itself.

Today’s world, as frequently stated, functions as a single interconnected body. Disrupting a strait, port, or energy source anywhere would harm every component of the global economic system.

Thus, military action against Iran today would not only collapse regional balances but also threaten to reorder international interactions chaotically and unprecedentedly. It is not merely an attack but a global political-economic earthquake with boundless and inevitably costly consequences.