Sudan’s armed movements are a result of the Brotherhood regime’s past strategies, which were ousted by a popular revolution in April 2019, of infiltrating the key groups and stoking tensions and separatist inclinations within them to simplify their containment. Sudan has 87 armed movements, 84 of which are concentrated in the Darfur area.
Many people believe that the approach of appeasement and division of positions encouraged many people to either separate from their original entities to form new factions or to build independent movements that do not have a large presence on the ground, but pose a security threat and impede any efforts for a final solution to the war crisis.
Most armed movements lack a precise methodological vision, but they take advantage of the absence of state prestige to impose the reality of force in certain regions, particularly given the proliferation of over two million firearms in the Darfur region alone.
The Sudanese government’s policy of seeking cosmetic solutions that do not address fundamental concerns in conflict zones is a direct cause of the expansion of armed movements.
In the case of Darfur, a peace accord will be signed in Juba by the end of 2020.
There are a few leaders that have broken away from their initial movements, but they don’t wield much authority on the ground. The most serious issue is the widespread distribution of guns throughout the public.
Despite the signing of the Sudanese Peace Agreement in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, the situation in Darfur remains one of great security turmoil and clear fragility, as evidenced by the events that erupted in the states of West and South Darfur over the last ten months, killing and injuring over 500,000 unarmed civilians, including women and children.
Many wonder whether the problem is originally due to a defect in the agreement and security arrangements, or the security vacuum that accompanied the start of the exit of the joint mission of the UN and the African Union (UNAMID).