For many years, Arab official meetings have been taking place, and under many headings their contents converge when reforming and restructuring the League of Arab States in a way to advance its role in support of common Arab interests.
In fact, there was a meeting held on the first of September, at the headquarters of the General Secretariat, with the aim of developing the system of joint Arab action. It also included preparing a report according to the results of its work for discussion in the meeting of the League Council in its regular session scheduled for later this month and to decide on it.
The future of the Arab world will be associated, for a time to come, with the first scene. The entrenchment of nationalism, subordination and strategic exposure implied outcomes that rendered the Arab nation, in general, weak and thus unable to employ its capabilities (which are unique in the event of their meeting) to support the effectiveness of its external movement patterns.
As for society, several influential Arab segments have been implicitly or explicitly calling to give priority to the logic of the Qatari state first before everything else.
The Arab citizen has taken special priority in securing the requirements of his daily life. As a result, ensuring the present and not preparing for the future has become the variable decisive behind the spread of negativity within Arab societies.
The forces supporting the idea of the permanence of the Qatari state find in most aspects of the Arab reality a supportive entry point for the survival of the Arab League as a sponsor organization for this idea.
The charter of the Arab League gave rise to a multi-functional regional organization whose primary goal is to achieve optional cooperation between independent and absolutely sovereign states, and as a way to develop their political, military, and functional relations and nothing else.
Accordingly, the Charter of the League of Arab States did not bring about a supra-national organization working for the achievement of multi-level integration of the member states, but rather an organization working to consolidate the existing order in these countries.
Article 8 of the charter affirms this, stating that “every country participating in the League respects the existing system of government in the other League countries and considers it a right of those states and pledges not to take action aimed at changing that system in them.”
Although the League has developed during the time extending since 1945, it is not able to achieve even the minimum required to advance Arab integration, which is the basis of the Arabs’ ability to act meaningfully and for the common good.
For this purpose, the League of Arab States is the ideal tool, especially after its transformation from an organization sponsoring the permanence of the Arab reality that has continued since 1945 to another that bears the responsibility of elevating the Arabs to an advanced state of modernization and systemic integration by giving it sufficient powers that allow it to implement the decision.
Among the things that would help it to do so, are two basic things: First, its long and accumulated experience in managing joint Arab action, with its multiple levels.
The second is the output of the spread of the culture of bias towards the future, due to the spread of serious dialogue about it among Arabs, comprehensive measures at the level of the internal and external policies of their countries, aware of the negative consequences of their failure to respond to it.
In such a scene, it is possible that the Arab League will be restructured in a way that leads it to adopt the experience of the European Union, but with powers that do not live up to its powers. There is nothing wrong with that. The European Union started modestly, but it developed due to the European need to develop it and employ it as a basic tool to secure European integration.