By: Salman Al-Ansari
Saudi geopolitical researcher
Around a decade ago, during a panel in Riyadh, New York Times columnist Tom Friedman argued that the world no longer divides between East and West, but between order and disorder. This framing perfectly captures the essence of the escalating friction currently unfolding between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
In recent days, many Western analysts have struggled to explain the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Consequently, much of their commentary remains contradictory or superficial at best. This piece aims to outline the key phases that led to this rupture with objective clarity.
Historically, Saudi Arabia took immense pride in being the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that never succumbed to foreign occupation. Before the union, the UAE existed as the Trucial States under British protection, while local rulers governed internal affairs. Riyadh consistently encouraged independence and self-rule across the Arab world during this formative period. Eventually, the British decided to end their presence, and Saudi Arabia supported the newly formed UAE with significant political backing. King Faisal recognized the UAE immediately and provided substantial financial support during the early 1970s to ensure its success.
Regional Security and Strategic Depth
Serious analysts within the GCC view Saudi Arabia as the region’s strategic depth and primary security backbone. This reality became evident during the liberation of Kuwait and the rapid deployment of forces to protect Bahrain. Diplomatically, the same protective approach was applied to the UAE when Iran began provoking the Emirates militarily in 2008. Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal affirmed Saudi determination to liberate the three Emirati islands occupied by Tehran.
However, Abu Dhabi surprised Riyadh by sending its foreign minister to Tehran to sign a cooperation agreement shortly thereafter. It seemed as if Abu Dhabi was apologizing to Tehran for Riyadh’s strong stance on Emirati sovereignty. While Saudi Arabia did not publicly object, the timing and style raised serious concerns in Riyadh and Washington alike. Over time, those concerns deepened because the UAE became Iran’s second-largest trading partner despite ongoing regional tensions. US Treasury sanctions recently highlighted UAE-based networks used for money laundering and terror financing as late as January 2026.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to uphold the UN Charter and counter the Iranian-backed Houthi militia. The UAE initially appeared fully aligned with the goal of restoring Yemen’s legitimate and internationally recognized government. Riyadh rewarded this cooperation by integrating the UAE deeply into Vision 2030 projects and various Saudi mega initiatives.
Unfortunately, Abu Dhabi did not reciprocate this trust and instead used joint mechanisms to understand Saudi economic plans. Riyadh eventually concluded that the UAE was not an economically reliable partner and scaled back cooperation accordingly. The decisive break occurred when Abu Dhabi’s actions in Yemen revealed a hidden agenda regarding strategic southern ports. Abu Dhabi split the Yemeni army, turned factions against one another, and created the disruptive Southern Transitional Council (STC). That moment convinced Riyadh that the UAE was no longer a trustworthy partner in economic, political, or security terms.
Paranoia and Policy Failure
Beyond Yemen, Abu Dhabi faced a grave reputational crisis when its proxy in Sudan faced implications for widespread genocide. Amid intense global outrage, Abu Dhabi announced nationwide military training and warned citizens not to take any photos. This show of force signaled that the leadership would not tolerate internal dissent regarding its failing foreign policy.
Furthermore, political paranoia took hold of senior circles in Abu Dhabi regarding Saudi influence in the United States. They mistakenly believed that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia lobbied Washington to impose sanctions on the UAE. This false allegation heavily influenced Abu Dhabi’s subsequent behavior and contributed to a series of increasingly reckless decisions.
The biggest misstep occurred when Abu Dhabi directed the STC to attempt territorial seizures during a GCC summit. Riyadh issued a 72-hour ultimatum, but Abu Dhabi instructed its agents to ignore the Saudi demand for withdrawal. Consequently, Saudi Arabia acted decisively by striking UAE military assets and dismantling the STC militia within five days. Riyadh merely lifted the diplomatic cover slightly, allowing its media to become critical of Abu Dhabi’s crimes and recklessness. Managing to finish a ten-year destabilizing project in just five days proves that Riyadh remains the ultimate guarantor of order.
