Is Yemen Becoming Another 2014 Iraq? Why the ‘Tactical Withdrawal’ Deserves Scrutiny
By Colonel Abbas Dahouk
Iran has not officially declared that it now controls the Bab al-Mandab, and Saudi Arabia has not yet reached what I would consider a threshold of pain that would compel it to intervene militarily in a major way. For now, Washington and Riyadh appear to be waiting to see how far this latest Houthi push and the PMF strikes will go.
The so-called “tactical withdrawal” by Yemeni government forces is questionable. If substantial equipment and military positions were left behind for the Houthis to capture, that raises serious questions about whether this was truly a deliberate tactical withdrawal or instead a breakdown in command, cohesion, and the will to fight.
I also see a possible attempt by the Yemeni government to replicate the Iraq-ISIS scenario. In the summer of 2014, ISIS overwhelmed Iraqi security forces, which collapsed and retreated as ISIS advanced toward Baghdad. The crisis ultimately prompted the United States to build an international coalition, including Saudi Arabia, to defeat ISIS through the Counter-ISIS Coalition. The situations are not identical, but the strategic calculation may be similar: allow the threat to grow, demonstrate that local forces cannot contain it, and then create the justification for outside powers to intervene and form a broader fighting coalition. That possibility deserves serious scrutiny.
My understanding from a White House source is that MBS and Trump remain closely coordinated and speak regularly. That U.S.-Saudi coordination will be critical as Washington and Riyadh assess where this is heading. Unlike the Obama administration, which viewed Yemen largely through the broader JCPOA strategy and the need to manage the Saudi-Iranian conflict, the Trump White House appears to be pursuing a larger strategic objective of its own. Both administrations, however, have viewed Yemen primarily through the lens of a civil war and a Saudi-Iranian conflict, rather than allowing Yemen alone to drive the broader U.S.-Iran strategy.
My concern is that the Yemeni government may be trying to draw the United States and Saudi Arabia into forming a broader fighting coalition to compensate for its own military shortcomings. But the fundamental question is this: if the Houthis can continue advancing without air superiority, why can’t government forces organize themselves, consolidate their forces, and conduct an effective offensive?
Government forces need to unite, reorganize, establish a clear chain of command, and demonstrate the political and military will to fight and win. Saudi and U.S. support can be decisive, but neither Washington nor Riyadh should be expected to substitute indefinitely for Yemeni leadership and military cohesion.
If that does not change, the danger is that Iran and the Houthis—not necessarily through one decisive battle, but through persistence, cohesion, and incremental gains—will ultimately shape the outcome in their favor.
Biography of the writer
Colonel Abbas Dahouk is a retired soldier-diplomat and inductee of the U.S. Army (OCS) Hall of Fame. A naturalized U.S. citizen, Dahouk brings a distinctive perspective shaped by his experiences during the Lebanese Civil War and a 33-year career in the U.S. Army, during which he served in a range of military, diplomatic, and national-security roles.
